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 Argumentation Schemes for Argument from Analogy (D. Walton) CRRAR 
Systematic Approaches to Argument from Analogy, ed. H. J. Ribeiro, Heidelberg, Springer, 2014, 23-40. 
 
     There is such a huge literature on argument from analogy that during the early stages of my 
career I avoided work on the subject because so many scholars in so many fields had already 
written so much about it. When asked by a group of graduate students whether it would be a 
good idea to start a research project on argument from analogy some time ago, I cautioned them 
against it, or at least warned them about the dangers inherent in such a project, simply because of 
this huge existing literature they would have to go through. The fields that comprise this 
literature include not only argumentation studies, but also logic, cognitive science, ethics, law, 
literature, philosophy of science, computer science and the social sciences generally (Guarini et 
al., 2009). However, it is an important type of argument for us in the field of argumentation 
studies to deal with, if only because it is such a common and pervasive form of argument almost 
everywhere, but also because many logic textbooks have emphasized how it is an important 
informal fallacy by citing examples of improper uses of argument from analogy (Kienpointner, 
2012). So recently I too, yielding to necessity, have taken up writing on argument from analogy. 
     After surveying the literature on argument from analogy in some recent work, I came to the 
conclusion that there are two different types of argument from analogy, each represented by its 
own argumentation scheme (Walton, 2010; Walton, 2012). This was very puzzling at first, 
because normally we would just like to have one scheme representing such a basic and 
distinctive type of argument. But it appears that there is wide disagreement on precisely what 
form the argument from analogy should be represented by, and below I will try to explain why in 
the end the hypothesis that argument from analogy has two separate schemes is not such a bad 
one and how this double scheme approach can be justified.  
     The first section of the paper uses some standard argument diagrams to explain how the first 
scheme represents argument from analogy as proceeding from a source case to a target case. The 
second section shows how this scheme applies to a famous case of argument from analogy in 
philosophy. The third section introduces the second argumentation scheme, based on comparing 
factors in two cases. The fourth section shows how factors are weighed in systems of case-based 
reasoning. The fifth section presents a famous case of argument from analogy in legal rhetoric. 
The sixth section models a notion of similarity using script-based technology from artificial 
intelligence. The last section provides conclusions on how to evaluate argument from analogy. 
 
1. The First Scheme 
 
     The following scheme (Walton, Reed and Macagno, 2008, 315) represents what is probably 
the most widely accepted version of the scheme for argument from analogy advocated in the 
logic textbooks and other relevant sources. C1 and C2 represent two cases. 
     Similarity Premise: Generally, case C1 is similar to case C2. 
     Base Premise: A is true (false) in case C1. 
     Conclusion: A is true (false) in case C2. 
This scheme requires that in order for something to qualify as an argument from analogy it must 
have one premise asserting that there is a similarity between two cases. A second requirement is 
that a proposition A must hold in the first case, or must be a conclusion that can be drawn in the 
first case. The conclusion drawn by the argument from analogy is that that A also holds in the 
second case. This version of the scheme for argument from analogy is the one used in the 
textbook (Walton, 2006, 96).  
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     The above version of the scheme conveys the basic idea behind it very well, but its ease of 
applicability to real cases can be improved (as will be shown below) by modifying it slightly. In 
the sequel, we will use this modified version. 
     Base Premise: A situation is described in C1. 
     Derived Premise: A is plausibly drawn as an acceptable conclusion in case C1. 
     Similarity Premise: Generally, case C1 is similar to case C2. 
     Conclusion: A is plausibly drawn as an acceptable conclusion in case C2. 
It doesn’t matter too critically which scheme you use. Using either one is better than using none 
at all. Whether a conclusion is plausibly drawn from a case depends on the audience to whom the 
argument was supposedly directed. The modified version brings out better how the derived 
premise is drawn as a conclusion by the audience from the source case. This modification makes 
the base premise slightly more complex and wordy, but as the reader will shortly see, it fits cases 
in a more natural way. Let us henceforth call this modified scheme the basic scheme for 
argument from analogy.  
     It is part of every argumentation scheme that it must have a matching set of critical questions 
that can be used to probe into weak parts of the argument of the type represented by the scheme 
The following set of critical questions according to the account given (Walton, Reed and 
Macagno, 2008, 315) matches the basic scheme for argument from analogy. 
     CQ1: Are there respects in which C1 and C2 are different that would tend to undermine the 
              force of the similarity cited? 
     CQ2: Is A the right conclusion to be drawn in C1? 
     CQ3: Is there some other case C3 that is also similar to C1, but in which some conclusion other 
              than A should be drawn? 
The first critical question relates to differences between the two cases that could detract from the 
strength of the argument from analogy, but respects in which two cases are similar could also be 
used to support the argument from analogy. The second critical question rather nicely paves the 
way to indicating why the reformulated version of the scheme is an improvement. A third critical 
question is associated with a familiar type of counterargument called the argument from counter-
analogy. The function of this critical question is to suggest doubt that could lead possibly to a 
plausible counterargument that could be used to attack the original argument. 
     It will also help us to use the standard terminology in the literature on argument from analogy 
to talk about the structure of argument from analogy. 
                 
A situation is described 
in the source case.
A conclusion is drawn by the 
audience in the source case.
A comparable conclusion is 
drawn in the target case.
             SOURCE CASE               TARGET CASE
Generally, the target case is 
similar to the source case.
 
 
               Figure 1: The Transition from the Source Case to the Target Case 
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In the argumentation scheme above, the original case C1 used to set up the argument from 
analogy is called the source case. The case C2 to which the situation in the first case is compared 
is called the target case. How argument works as a transfer of data from one case through an 
argument to another case is graphically shown in figure 1. 
     In figure 2 we see the characteristic movement from one case to another that is the basic 
mechanism of argument from analogy. But the structure of the argument as a sequence of 
reasoning where the basic scheme links the premises to the conclusion has not been revealed yet.  
     Figure 2 shows how argument from analogy, and also argument from counteranalogy poised 
to attack an argument from analogy that was originally set forth, can be visually represented 
using an argument diagram. In this diagram the propositions composing the premises and 
conclusion are shown in text boxes, and the inferential link leading from a premise or a set of 
premises to a conclusion is drawn by an arrow leading to the conclusion on a set of lines leading 
to the premises. In the intersection of these lines there is a node representing the argument itself, 
which is shown on the diagram containing annotation representing the name of the 
argumentation scheme. 
 
          
A situation is described 
in the source case.
A conclusion C is drawn 
in the source case.
A conclusion comparable to C 
should be drawn in the target case.
The target case is similar 
to the source case.
+AN
There is a 
third case.
The third case is similar 
to the target case.
A conclusion other than C 
is drawn in the third case.
-AN
 
 
          Figure 2: Argument from Analogy with Argument from Counteranalogy 
 
The diagram has been drawn in the style of an argument map constructed with the Carneades 
Argumentation System, where every argument is represented as a pro or con argument. A pro 
argument has a plus sign in its argument node while a con argument has a minus sign in its 
argument node. Accordingly, in figure 2, the argument from analogy at the top is represented as 
a pro argument supporting conclusion on the right. The argument at the bottom is represented as 
a con argument that attacks the conclusion of the prior argument. 
     It is often said in argumentation studies that there are three basic ways an argument can be 
attacked. You can attack one or more of the premises, you can attack the conclusion, or you can 
attack the inferential link between the premises and conclusion. In this instance the argument 
from counteranalogy is used to argue that the conclusion of the prior argument from analogy is 
not acceptable. The type of attack represented in figure 2 is of the second type where the attack is 
against the conclusion of the prior argument. 
 
2. The Violinist Example 
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     Possibly the most famous use of argument from analogy argument from analogy in twentieth-
century philosophy was the violinist example of Thomson (1971, 48-49), quoted below. 
 
You wake up in the morning and find yourself back to back in bed with an unconscious 
violinist. A famous unconscious violinist. He has been found to have a fatal kidney 
ailment, and the Society of Music Lovers has canvassed all the available medical records 
and found that you alone have the right blood type to help. They have therefore 
kidnapped you, and last night the violinist's circulatory system was plugged into yours, so 
that your kidneys can be used to extract poisons from his blood as well as your own. The 
director of the hospital now tells you, “Look, we're sorry the Society of Music Lovers did 
this to you - we would never have permitted it if we had known. But still, they did it, and 
the violinist now is plugged into you. To unplug you would be to kill him. But never 
mind, it’s only for nine months. By then he will have recovered from his ailment, and can 
safely be unplugged from you.”  
 
This argument was deployed by Thomson to support the thesis that a woman should have the 
right to terminate her pregnancy, by arguing that the person in the example should have the right 
to unhook the violinist. The basis of the argument is that the situation of the violinist is similar to 
the situation of a pregnant woman. The conclusion that will plausibly be drawn by anyone 
presented with the situation of the violinist, as Thomson rightly supposed, is that the person in 
the example should have the right to unplug himself from the violinist, even though the violinist 
will die as a result. But since this source case is similar to the target case of a woman who is 
pregnant, the conclusion suggested in the target case is that a pregnant woman may terminate her 
pregnancy, even though the fetus will die as a result. 
     How the refined version of the basic scheme for argument from analogy applies to the 
violinist argument can be shown visually in figure 3.  
 
       
A situation is described in the 
violinist case (the source case).
The conclusion that the violinist 
should have the right to unplug 
himself is drawn in the source case.
The pregnant woman should have 
the right to terminate her pregnancy.
The pregnant woman case is 
similar to the violinist case.
+AN
 
 
              Figure 3: Argument from Analogy in the Violinist Case 
 
     There are many ways to support or attack this argument. Some might want to extend it further 
by claiming that it justifies abortion. However, this particular issue has been so widely and hotly 
disputed that it also turns on how the term ‘abortion’ is defined. The pro-choice side defines it as 
removal of the fetus whereas the pro-life side defines it as the killing of a person. So there are all 
kinds of controversial counterargument moves surrounding this case, but this paper is not the 
place to comment on these. Nevertheless, the case can be used to illustrate how some types of 
arguments from analogy work, precisely because it is a powerful and clever argument, and 
probably the best-known use of argument from analogy in recent philosophy. 
5 
 
 
     There are many ways to support or attack Thomson’s argument in the huge literature it 
provoked, but that is not our subject here. All we need to observe is that CQ2 is possibly the 
critical question that an audience who is not so enthusiastically pro-choice or pro-life would be 
most naturally inclined to raise. In the source case the violinist and the person to whom he was 
attached are presumed to be unrelated, while in the abortion case the woman and the fetus are 
arguably related. There is also another aspect of the argument to be careful about. Because it is 
true in the source case that the person in the example was kidnapped and so did nothing himself 
to cause the violinist to be attached to him, the argument from analogy is only applicable to cases 
where the woman had no choice about becoming pregnant, for example, cases of rape. This 
narrowing of the range of the argument detracts considerably for the weight of its support for the 
conclusion that abortion should be generally acceptable if a woman chooses it.  
      From a point of view of argumentation theory, the most interesting aspect of the example is 
how the notion of similarity in the similarity premise can be defined or analyzed. I have 
previously put forward a theory that provides an answer to this question, but before introducing 
it, let’s go on to consider another very different but equally interesting kind of example.     
 
3. The Second Scheme 
 
     The second scheme proposed to model analogical argument is the dominant one in the logic 
textbooks. It is advocated in the two most widely used logic textbooks. It treats the argument 
from analogy as an inductive form of argument that requires no reference to similarity. In this 
respect, it can be sharply contrasted with the first scheme. 
     Copi and Cohen (1990, 358) offer the example of a conjecture on whether the planets Saturn, 
Jupiter, Mars, Venus and Mercury, might have living creatures on them. This example is an old 
one that has been superseded by the advance of science, but it is at least clear enough to be used 
to try to grasp how Copi and Cohen’s form of analogical argument is supposed to fit some more 
or less realistic case. The premises are the observations of similarities between these planets and 
earth. All these planets revolve around the sun, collect light from the sun, revolve around their 
axis, have a succession of day and night, and so forth. They all share all these characteristics with 
planet Earth. There are also certain respects in which they differ from Earth. Some of them 
revolve around their axis in a manner like Earth, while others do not. Some have moons, while 
others do not. According to the example, the conclusion drawn from these similarities, despite 
the differences, is that it is reasonable to think that these planets may, like Earth, exhibit the 
habitation of various orders of living creatures. 
     To represent the structure of argument from analogy in this example Copi and Cohen (1990, 
360) offer the following form they call analogical argument. 
     Entities a, b, c, d all have the attributes P and Q. 
     a, b, c all have the attribute R. 
     Therefore d probably has the attribute R. 
Copi and Cohen (1990, 357) state that arguments of this form are inductive, not deductive. They 
(363-365) offer six criteria for appraising analogical arguments. Four are worth mentioning here: 
the number of entities compared, the number of respects in which the things compared are said to 
be analogous, the number of disanalogies or points of differences between the entities compared 
and the entity in the conclusion, and whether the analogies are relevant. 
     Let’s try to see how their form of argument fits their planets example. Start with the 
conclusion. Earth fits in for the variable d, and R means having habitation of living creatures, 
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since the conclusion is the statement that Earth, exhibits the habitation of various orders of living 
creatures. But that is not the conclusion. As noted above, the conclusion is the statement that it is 
reasonable to think that these other planets may, like Earth, exhibit the habitation of various 
orders of living creatures. How the form fits the example is unclear. 
     Hurley (2003, 469) offers the following structure to represent the form of argument from 
analogy. 
     Entity A has attributes a, b, c and z. 
     Entity B has attributes a, b, c. 
     Therefore, entity B probably has z also. 
This format of this structure for argument from analogy is different from the one offered by Copi 
and Cohen, but the motivating idea behind it seems to be pretty much the same. Hurley also 
classifies argument from analogy as an inductive form of argument. Also in a manner quite 
similar to Copi and Cohen’s approach, Hurley, 469-470 offers six criteria for appraising 
analogical arguments: (1) relevance of the similarities, (2) number of similarities, (3) nature and 
degree of disanalogy, (4) number of primary analogues, (5) diversity among the primary 
analogues, and (6) specificity of the conclusion. 
     Hurley (2003, 469-470) illustrates these criteria using with a leading example. In this example 
a woman called Lucy is deciding on which new car to buy. She decides in favor of the Chevrolet 
because she wants good gas mileage and she has observed that her friend Tom has a new 
Chevrolet and it gets good gas mileage. But some other similarities might be irrelevant. Both 
cars have a padded steering wheel, vinyl upholstery, tinted windows and white paint. Additional 
similarities which would support the argument from analogy might include such things as the 
weight of the car, whether it has an aerodynamic body, and the kinds of tires that are on it. 
Differences between the two cars might be that Tom’s car has overdrive but Lucy’s does not, or 
that Lucy's car is equipped with a turbocharger and Tom’s is not. The number of analogues 
might include additional cases known to Lucy. Three of her friends drive cars similar to Tom’s 
and all three get good gas mileage. The factor of diversity among the cases cited is illustrated by 
the example of Lucy’s four friends who all do their driving on level streets in a cautious manner 
that minimizes fuel consumption. The sixth criterion of specificity of the conclusion is less easy 
to explain, but what Hurley is telling us is that we have to pay attention to the way the conclusion 
is stated because a more specific conclusion will be harder to prove and easier to falsify than one 
that is less specific. 
     How Hurley’s proposed form of the argument from analogy fits his example is clearer. The 
conclusion is the presumably the statement that if Lucy buys a Chevrolet, this car will get good 
gas mileage According to Hurley (470), Lucy’s conclusion is that her car will get good gas 
mileage, but technically it is not her car until she buys it. The argument is also an instance of 
goal-directed decision-making on what to do under conditions of uncertainty. The argument 
supporting this conclusion is that Tom’s Chevrolet (assumed to share many attributes with the 
one Lucy will buy), has the attribute of good gas mileage. The variable B represents the car Lucy 
is considering buying, and the variable z represents the attribute of getting good gas mileage. The 
example can then be expanded to take other Chevrolet owners in to account. If they get good 
mileage this evidence supports the argument from analogy. If there are some Chevrolets that do 
not get good gas mileage, this evidence undermines (weakens) the argument from analogy.  
     For purposes of ease of applicability to cases, I would say that Hurley’s version is an 
improvement on Copi and Cohen’s. But the main thing we need take from these observations is 
that the two leading logic textbooks both present a fundamentally similar account of the form of 
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the argument from analogy. Both have this same sort of underlying structure as arguments, 
which can be formulated succinctly as a rule of inference. To grasp the rule of inference, begin 
with the instance of it in Hurley’s example. If Lucy’s car shares a set of properties with other 
Chevrolets, and the other Chevrolets also exhibit some new property not included in the original 
set, then Lucy’s car is likely to have this new property as well. The general rule of inference can 
now be formulated as follows: if one designated entity shares a set of properties with other 
entities, and the other entities also exhibit some new property not included in the original set, the 
designated entity is likely, on a balance of considerations, to have this new property as well. 
     The most important thing to notice about this way of representing the logical form of 
argument from analogy is that it makes no reference to the notion of similarity. The textbook 
accounts make argument from analogy seem highly objective. It looks like it represents a type of 
argument that can be evaluated in a scientific and objective manner using inductive reasoning to 
count up the properties shared by a set of entities to provide positive evidence supporting the 
argument from analogy and subtract the negative evidence of entities that fail to share common 
properties. There is no need for students to ask embarrassing questions about similarity. 
 
4. Weighing Factors Using the Second Scheme 
 
     Now we turn to the second scheme for argument from analogy. The problem with this 
scheme, as set forth in the standard textbook treatments, is that it is unclear in many respects how 
it fits real examples, and hence trying to apply schemes offered in the textbooks was somewhat 
confusing. Luckily this scheme has been formulated in a simpler way that is more useful. Guarini 
(2004, 161) offered a scheme for argument from analogy that he calls the core scheme, where a 
and b are individual objects. 
 
Premise 1: a has features f1, f2, . . . , fn. 
Premise 2: b has features f1, f2, . . . , fn. 
Conclusion: a and b should be treated or classified in the same way with respect to f1, f2, . . . , fn. 
 
It would seem plausible that the features f1, f2, . . . , fn can be treated as representing the factors 
that were discussed above in relating case-based reasoning to the second scheme. The Chevrolet 
case we looked at from Hurley showed how the second scheme is applied to cases by identifying 
pro and contra factors, factors in which the two cases at issue are similar or different. In the 
discussion above we already identified the rule underlying this scheme. The rule basically states 
that the argument from analogy is supported by factors both cases share, but at the same time the 
argument from analogy is undermined by factors that both cases fail to share. This rule is fine as 
far as it goes, but the problem is that it is not just counting up of the factors that make the 
argument from analogy weaker or stronger. In addition some level of importance or weight has 
to be attached to each factor. In case-based reasoning, the more a factor is “on point” (relevant), 
the greater weight it carries. Any factor that is irrelevant carries no weight. 
     The methods of evaluating an argument from analogy in standard case-based reasoning 
(CBR) uses respects in which two cases are similar or different called dimensions and factors. 
The HYPO system (Ashley, 2006) uses dimensions. A dimension is a relevant aspect of the case 
that can take a range of values that move along the scale with values that support one side on a 
disputed issue at one end and the opposed party at the other end. CATO is a simpler CBR system 
(Aleven, 1997) that uses factors.  
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     Factors in Hurley’s case of Lucy buying the car would include the following: the model of 
car, the size of the motor, having overdrive, having a turbocharger, the weight of the car, what 
kinds of tires are on the car, having a padded steering wheel, having tinted windows, and paint 
color. Some factors are relevant while others are not. Factors can also be seen as arguments 
favoring one side or the other in relation to the issue being disputed. Having more relevant 
factors in common between the source case and the target case supports the argument from 
analogy. Having more relevant factors not in common between the source case and the target 
case detracts from the argument from analogy.   
     Factors can also be seen as arguments favoring one side or the other in relation to the issue 
being disputed.  On this approach, argument from analogy is seen as a defeasible form of 
argument in which pro factors represents similarities that support the argument while con factors 
represent dissimilarities undermine or detract from the argument. Typically in argument from 
analogy some factors support the argument, while other factors undermine it. Then to weigh the 
strength of the argument from analogy, we have to weigh the pro factors against the con factors. 
To do this numerically we have to attach a positive or negative number to each factor providing a 
measure of how relevant that factor is one way or the other. If we could use numbers of this sort 
to calculate the strength of an argument from analogy, the argument could rightly be classified as 
inductive, as they advocate. But if this numerical approach does not seem promising, there is also 
another approach. On this approach, argument from analogy can be seen as dialectical.  
     Typically, in this kind of format, we have an argument from analogy that supports a claim A 
made by one side, and then on the other side an opposed argument from analogy that supports 
claim not-A. To comparatively weigh up the strength of the one argument as compared to the 
strength of the opposed argument, we have to bring in factors that identify the respects in which 
one case is similar to the other, and have some device for estimating how similar one is to the 
other by attaching weights to similarity. But there is always the problem of how misleading it 
might be to attach numbers to the weight of importance each factor should have in a given case. 
There may be a way we can use argumentation methods to solve this problem however. We can 
get a clue how it should work by looking at CBR. 
     HYPO evaluates arguments from analogy in a three-step method called three-ply 
argumentation (Ashley, 1988, 206), which can also be modeled as a series of moves in a formal 
dialogue. At the first move, the proponent puts forward an argument from analogy by finding a 
comparable past case in which the outcome closely matches that of the proponent’s thesis 
because the two cases share one or more factors. At the second move, the respondent can reply to 
the original argument from analogy in one of the following ways, corresponding to critical 
questions matching the scheme for argument from analogy. She can reply by finding a counter-
analogy, a past case that matches the current case but which has the opposite outcome. Another 
reply is to “distinguish” the case (as this move often called) by pointing to factors present in the 
new case that are absent in the previous one. At the third move, the proponent can reply in one of 
several ways. These might include distinguishing counterexamples, pointing out additional 
factors, or citing other cases showing that the respondent’s attack does not really rebut his 
argument from analogy. The three-ply argumentation could be used to effectively set up the pre 
and post conditions for a formal dialogue model of a critical discussion in which one type of 
move is the bringing forth of an argument from analogy by citing factors common to the source 
case and the target case, and another type of move allows an appropriate critical response of the 
kinds outlined above. 
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5. The Silkwood Case  
 
     The next example is a use of argument from analogy by attorney Gerry Spence in the case of 
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corporation. Karen Silkwood was a technician who had the job of 
grinding and polishing plutonium pins used to make fuel rods for nuclear reactors. She was 
active in union activities and had investigated health and safety issues at the plant. She had 
testified before an atomic energy commission that Kerr-McGee had violated safety regulations. 
Tests in 1974 showed that she that she had been exposed to dangerously high levels of plutonium 
radiation. High levels of radioactive contamination were found in her apartment. After she died 
from radiation poisoning, her father brought an action against Kerr-McGee in which the 
Corporation was held to be at fault for her death on the basis of strict liability. According to strict 
liability law, a person can be held accountable for the harmful consequences of some dangerous 
activity he was engaged in, without having to prove that he was aware of or intended the 
outcome, or even that he was negligent. The standard example is that if a zookeeper has a 
dangerous lion in a cage, if the lion escapes and causes harm to some person, the zookeeper is 
strictly liable for the harm that was caused. 
     Spence’s closing argument in this case used the analogy of the escaping lion with great 
rhetorical effect on the jury. In his speech to the jury he emphasized and repeated this statement 
“If the lion got away, Kerr-McGee has to pay” (Lief et al., 1998, 129). 
 
Some guy brought an old lion on his ground, and he put it in a cage - and lions are 
dangerous -and through no negligence of his own through no fault of his own, the lion 
got away. Nobody knew how - like in this case, ‘‘nobody knew how’’. And, the lion went 
out and he ate up some people - and they sued the man. And they said, you know: ‘‘Pay. 
It was your lion, and he got away’’. And the man says: ‘‘But I did everything in my 
power - I had a good cage - had a lock on the door - I did everything that I could - I had 
security - I had trained people watching the lion - and it isn’t my fault that he got away’’. 
Why should we punish him? They said: ‘‘We have to punish him - we have to punish you 
- you have to pay’’. You have to pay because it was your lion - unless the person who 
was hurt let the lion out himself. 
 
In this instance Spence used the lion analogy during his closing argument, a part of the trial for 
summing up one’s argument in a case. In his opening statement, Spence had also used the 
example of the escaping lion to illustrate to the jury how strict liability works, showing them 
how cases of this kind had originated in English common law. In his closing argument, he was 
using the same argument about the lion over again with great rhetorical effect. Spence’s 
argument in this famous case has been said to be “as fine a closing argument as has ever been 
delivered in an American courtroom” (Lief et al., 1998, 123-124). 
     Spence was using an analogy to compare what happened in the Silkwood case to what 
happened in the lion example that is described in simple and graphic terms. The lion example is 
the source case in the argument from analogy. Spence used the example to illustrate that strict 
liability law would hold the lion owner responsible for the harm that took place when the lion 
attacked some innocent person and injured her, even though the lion keeper had taken great care 
to have proper security, including trained people watching the animal. The target case is similar 
to the source case. The plutonium escaped from Silkwood’s workplace, so to speak, and caused 
harm to her, and this sequence of events is similar to the ones in the lion case. Therefore all 
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Spence had to prove is that Karen Silkwood was harmed by the plutonium. In his summary 
argument, Spence reminds the jury that this claim has been proved during the trial by the 
evidence brought forward, and that there is no need to repeat the facts that were used to prove it. 
All that needs to be proved, Spence maintains, in parallel with the lion case, is that the plutonium 
got away and that Karen Silkwood was damaged. This argument was a rhetorically powerful one. 
It persuaded the jury to find the Kerr-McGee Corporation liable for over ten million dollars.      
     In this case, the argument from analogy does all the work. The problem is to grasp how it 
does that. As a first attempt, we can visualize the argument as shown in figure 4. 
 
        
In the lion case, the lion owner had taken 
great care to have proper security.
The law holds the lion 
owner liable for the harm.
Nevertheless, the lion escaped 
and someone was harmed. 
In the Silkwood case, Kerr-McGee had 
taken care to have proper security.
Nevertheless, the plutonium escaped 
from the plant and Silkwood was harmed.
The law holds Kerr-McGee 
liable for the harm.
The lion case is similar 
to the Silkwood case.
In the lion case, the law held the owner 
of the escapee liable for the harm.
+AN
 
 
        Figure 4: How the Source Case Supports the Argument of the Target Case 
 
To get a clue how Spence’s argument in the Silkwood case could be represented using the 
scheme for argument from analogy, we need to recall how in section 1 the argument from 
analogy was described as a two-step argument from the base premise to a derived premise, and 
from there to a conclusion. Using this scheme, argument from analogy represents a two-step type 
of argument. This two-step configuration is shown in figure 4. At the top the lion argument is 
shown, representing the source case. At the bottom the Silkwood case is shown, representing the 
target case. In the middle, an argument from analogy goes from a premise derived from the 
conclusion of the source case, along with the similarity premise, to the ultimate conclusion that 
the law holds Kerr-McGee liable. In the source case, as well as the target case, the argument is 
also at taken to support the similarity premise of the argument from analogy. 
     This structure is a rather complicated one, however, and not very helpful in giving us a clear 
and easily understandable analysis of how the argument from analogy works in transferring 
evidence from the source case to the target case. Hence we need to look for another method of 
modeling structure of the argument from analogy in the Silkwood case. It is a simple and 
powerful argument, and that is part of what accounts for its rhetorical success when used by 
Spence. But we still haven’t been able to model the structure of that simple and powerful 
argument in a satisfactory way. So now we turn to an altogether different approach. 
 
6. Scripts and Similarity 
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     The first scheme is most markedly different from the second one in that it had a premise 
stating that one case is similar to another. The main problem with applying the first scheme to 
any realistic examples of arguments from analogy is to define the notion of similarity. There can 
be different kinds of similarity, but there is a way of defining one kind that can be shown to be 
important in building a method for evaluating arguments from analogy.  
     The notion of a script has been around for a while in artificial intelligence (Schank and 
Abelson, 1977). According to the theory of scripts put forward here, a script is defined as a 
sequence of states where one state follows naturally from another so that a sequence of states can 
be chained together. The scripts we are concerned with in this paper are comparable to sequences 
of actions of the kind studied in the branch of philosophy called action theory. An example is the 
following sequence: Bob swings his golf club, he hits a golf ball, the golf ball flies through the 
air, the golf ball lands on the grass, the golf ball rolls towards the cup, the golf ball stops at a 
point six inches short of the cup. We can see from the example that each state in the sequence is 
represented as a proposition in which an agent carries out an action. All of us understand that in 
order for the sequence to be comprehensible the propositions fall naturally into a certain ordering 
so that it can be established by a participant in an argument using common knowledge what that 
ordering is. A script can be defined as a set of states and a set of so-called links. A script in this 
sense is (1) a finite sequence of states, S1, S2, . . .,Sn, and a set of links, L1, L2, . . , Ln, joining each 
state to the one before and one after it, excluding only the first state L1 and the last state, Ln , (2) 
such that it is clear to participants in an argument which is the first member of the sequence, 
which is the last member of the sequence, and for any member of the sequence between the first 
and the last member, which is the one before and the one after it. The ordering is not necessarily 
a temporal one, but it often is, and it is not necessarily a causal one but it often is. Links can be 
of different kinds, so that the sequence is not defined by any one kind of link. Rather the 
sequence is defined by the way it hangs together in common knowledge we all have about the 
way things can be normally expected to go in a kind of situation familiar to us from past 
experiences. 
     A sequence of this sort is often called a story or narrative. Pennington and Hastie (1992) 
studied many examples to show how juries in trials use story structures to organize and interpret 
evidence in a legal case at trial, enabling them to make sense of the evidence as a whole by 
organizing it into a mental representation. Stories are different from argumentation schemes, but 
they are often based on argumentation schemes, especially the scheme for practical reasoning. In 
practical reasoning an agent has a goal, and sees that carrying out an action would be a means to 
realize the goal. For this reason the agent concludes that it ought practically speaking to carry out 
the action. This kind of reasoning is very common in legal cases, for example in criminal cases 
where an action is presumed to have a goal.   
     Bex (2011) built a hybrid theory of reasoning with stories to reconstruct complex networks of 
evidence in criminal cases. His theory is called a hybrid system because it combines story-based 
explanations with arguments. One feature of it is that evidence in the form of arguments can 
support parts of an explanation that can be modeled with a script. Another aspect of Bex’s theory 
that will be applied here is that something called a story scheme can be derived from the events 
in a script through a process of applying abstractions. By this means a script that links together a 
sequence of events or actions described in the story can also be represented at a more abstract 
level by means of a story scheme. Bex and Prakken (2010) have shown how stories can be 
investigated and evaluated in a formal dialogue game. 
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     The device of the story scheme can be applied to Spence’s argument from analogy in the 
Silkwood case to map the sequence in the source case to the sequence in the target case. If we 
put the lion in for x, the person who was injured in for y, and the lion owner in for z, we get the 
story of the lion that escaped and attacked the person who was harmed. But we can also fill in the 
variables as shown in figure 5, and then we get the Silkwood story. It is this abstract story 
scheme that shows how the target case is similar to the source case in the most significant 
respect. The script in the two cases can be seen to be similar by the audience (in this instance, the 
jury), and because of their common knowledge of the way things generally work, they are 
impressed by the analogy and draw the conclusion that Spence wants them to. 
 
 
    
x is very 
dangerous 
to person y.
x is securely 
contained so   
it can cause 
no harm to y.
x belongs to 
z who keeps 
x securely 
contained. 
x is no 
longer 
securely 
contained.
x 
harms 
y.
z is liable to y for the 
harm caused to y.
Nobody 
knows how 
x got out.
 
 
   Figure 5: Story Scheme for Spence’s Argument from Analogy in the Silkwood Case 
 
     A notion of similarity that can be used to model many cases of argument from analogy can be 
modeled using this hybrid theory of scripts (Walton, 2012). Gerry Spence’s argument from 
analogy in his closing argument in the Silkwood case can be used as an illustration. 
 
 
       
Plutonium 
is very 
dangerous 
to  
employees.
The plutonium 
was securely 
contained so   
it can cause 
no harm to 
employees.
The 
plutonium 
belonged to 
Kerr-McGee 
who kept it 
securely 
contained. 
The 
Plutonium 
was no 
longer 
securely 
contained.
Silkwood 
was 
harmed 
by the 
pluto-
nium.
Kerr-McGee is liable to Silkwood 
for the harm caused to her.
Nobody 
knows 
how the 
plutonium 
got out.
+EX
Witness Smith said 
that plutonium is very 
dangerous to humans. 
Witness Smith 
is an expert.
+CT
Kerr-McGee admitted in court that 
the plutonium belonged to them.
+WT
Witnesses testified 
that Kerr-McGee 
kept the plutonium 
securely contained,
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         Figure 6: The Silkwood Case Modeled as a Story with Evidential Backing 
 
     If we look along the middle row of figure 6, we see this story in the Silkwood case 
instantiated as an instance of the story scheme shown in figure 5. While the story scheme shown 
in figure 5 is an abstract sequence, the Silkwood story shown along the middle row of figure 6 
represents the actual sequence of events representing the story in the case. To show how the 
similarity between the two cases is modeled, we could also make a figure of the similar story in 
the lion case: the lion is very dangerous, the lion was securely contained so it could cause no 
harm, the lion belong to the lion owner who kept it securely contained, the lion was no longer 
securely contained, nobody knows how the lion got out, a person was harmed by the lion after it 
escaped. What explains the similarity is that both the sequence of events in the lion case and in 
the Silkwood case is the abstract story scheme shown in figure 5. 
     It could be stressed that what is especially interesting here is that the matching of the two 
stories shows that the similarity between the two cases holds not just because each state in the 
one case matches a comparable state in the other case. Over and above this matching of single 
states, the matching of two stories represents the kind of similarity that supports an argument 
from analogy because it is the same story scheme applicable to both cases that makes the one 
case similar to the other in the most important respect. 
     There are some other aspects shown in figure 6 that are also important to comment on. One is 
the conclusion drawn from the sequence of states shown in the middle row. This conclusion is 
the proposition that Kerr-McGee is liable to Silkwood for the harm caused to her. According to 
the theory advocated here, this conclusion is the one drawn from the sequence of states shown 
above it. Another important aspect of figure 6 is that four statements appear in text boxes along 
the top row of the diagram, displaying three arguments that are used as evidence to support some 
of the elements in the sequence of propositions in the middle row. In each case the name of the 
argumentation scheme is shown in the node of the argument. The argument on the left is a pro 
argument from expert opinion. The argument in the middle is a pro argument from commitment. 
The argument on the right is a pro argument from witness testimony. 
     Thus we can see that figure 6 displays the five characteristic elements of the theory of 
similarity put forward. The first one is that there is a sequence of propositions (a set of states and 
links joining them), that makes up the story in the target case, and is an instance of a story 
scheme. The second one is that there is a conclusion drawn from the story. The third one is that 
evidence in the form of arguments can be used to support the elements of the story, make it more 
plausible. The fourth one is that the story in the target case is an instance of an abstract story 
scheme. The fifth one is that the story in the source case fits the same story scheme. 
   
7. Conclusions 
   
     The solution to the problem is to combine the two argumentation schemes for argument from 
analogy. The first scheme can be applied to a text to identify an argument from analogy and 
explain its initial impact. The second scheme allows for deeper analysis and evaluation of the 
argument by weighing the pro against the con factors. 
      The first scheme is simple enough. It simply says that if two cases are similar, and a 
particular conclusion can be drawn in the first case, then the same conclusion (or a comparable 
one) can be drawn in the second case. That conditional represents the rule of inference (the so-
called warrant) behind the first scheme. The problem with the first scheme was to define the 
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notion of similarity. Above a script-based model of how to represent similarity was presented 
and illustrated using the argument from analogy put forward by Gerry Spence in Silkwood case.  
     Now we can see how the same script-based theory of similarity can also be applied to the 
violinist case. Figure 7 shows how the abstract story script that displays the similarity between 
the case of the violinist and the case of the justification of abortion leads to the abstract 
conclusion that is applicable to both cases. 
 
     
Person x 
has another 
person y 
attached to 
his/her  
body. 
Person x 
had no 
choice 
about the 
arrange-
ment.
Having y 
attached 
is an 
encumb-
rance for 
x.
Having this  
encumb-
rance will 
hinder x’s 
daily 
activities.
y will die 
if 
removed 
from x.
y can only 
survive if 
attached 
to x for 9 
months.
x should be permitted to have 
a choice about removing y.
Any case fitting this script allows the 
following form of conclusion to be inferred.
SCRIPT
 
 
Figure 7: The Story Scheme Supporting the Argument from Analogy of the Violinist Case 
 
What the diagram in figure 7 shows in an abstract way is the similarity underlying the two cases 
that is the basis of the argument from analogy from the source case to the target case. The story 
scheme representing the similarity in an abstract manner supports the similarity premise of the 
basic argumentation scheme for argument from analogy. 
      As shown in section 4, applying the second scheme requires a three-ply case-based dialogue 
system. How would such a formal dialogue model solve the problem of assigning weights to the 
factors in an argument from analogy without running afoul of the problem of assigning 
numerical weights to each factor that might be arbitrary? The solution advocated here is to do 
this in the normal way we are familiar with in formal dialogue models of argumentation. The 
claim that a factor is present in a given case, or is not present in a given case, or the claim that 
the factor is important in deciding the outcome of the case, or is not, can be evaluated by 
examining the details of the case, or the pair of cases at issue. Such a procedure can be used to 
see how the arguments in the case support or undermine these claims. The method that CBR uses 
to weigh factors is to place values on them representing the extent to which factor is “on point”. 
To be on point essentially means that the factor is relevant in relation to the issue being disputed. 
What this observation reveals is that ultimately CBR depends on an analysis of the notion of 
relevance. But the best way to model relevance is to use a formal model of the critical discussion 
requiring that a conflict of opinions is identified at the opening stage. It is this initial conflict of 
opinions that determines whether a given argument is relevant or not, and it can also be used to 
determine whether a factor in an argument from analogy is on point or not. 
     This project can be carried out formally in a number of ways. One way would be to use a 
formal computational system such as the Carneades Argumentation System (CAS), a three-
valued system in which premises and conclusions are assigned one of the following three values: 
(in) accepted, (out) rejected, or (neither in nor out) stated but not accepted (Gordon, 2010). CAS 
has an opening stage, an argumentation stage and a closing stage (Gordon, Prakken and Walton, 
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2007). Relevance of the kind discussed above can be modeled in CAS or comparable 
knowledge-based argumentation systems. Modeling the evaluation of arguments from analogy in 
this way has not yet been carried out in any formal dialectical model, but the research project of 
constructing such a model is within the reach of the current technology of formal dialogue 
systems. Such a project, at any rate, presents us with an alternative to the Bayesian proposal of 
treating argument from analogy as an inductive form of argument that can be evaluated using 
numerical probability values. 
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Abstract: Argumentation Schemes for Argument from Analogy 
 
In this paper I show how there are two different argumentation schemes for argument from 
analogy, and show by means of examples how each scheme applies to different cases in its own 
distinctive way. One scheme is based on similarity, while the other scheme is based on factors 
shared or not shared by two cases that are being compared. The problem confronted in the paper 
is to study how the two schemes fit together. Are there really two different schemes for argument 
from analogy, or is the one scheme an extension of the other that applies at a different dialectical 
stage of the argumentation in a case? Since argument from analogy is fundamental in case-based 
reasoning and legal reasoning, there is some discussion of how the schemes fit into both topics. 
